New statutes/missions for companies: an opportunity to enable them to democratize their governance through fiscal scheme, and thus transform the incentive systems?

Abstract

We ask ourselves how the introduction of new statutes could have made it possible to curb the current drifts in the incentive tax system for companies by imposing organisational counterparts to the granting of tax benefits and/or by differentiating company taxes according to their democratic level. As the usual tax incentives, marked by sectoral particularism, pile up without having a positive impact on corporate governance, we assume that it would be appropriate to provide a tax incentive to transform the organisation of companies in order to enable them to achieve ecological and social targets. This requires a reorientation of corporate tax incentives. We will show that the PACTE law, as well as the law on duty of care, or the law on SSE, by not envisaging to rely on precise organisational criteria in order to indicate a transformation of governance, have not made it possible either to change the drift of the current tax incentives or to push companies to fulfil their statutory objectives.