DE LA RESSOURCE COMMUNE AU PÉRIL COMMUN : REPENSER NOS MODÈLES DE L’ACTION CLIMATIQUE

Abstract

Reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions is one of the main challenges to limit global warming and it requires an unprecedented form of collective action. Most of the imaginable mechanisms to organize climate action such as carbon tax, are based on a “polluter pays” principle and fail to conciliate equity and effectiveness. The yellow vests movement in 2018 in France has epitomized such incompatibility. To get out of this dilemma, we assume that we need to change the way the situation is conceptualized. Indeed, we usually consider that the actors at play are all independent from each other, and only tied together by a limited resource. This model tends to make actors individually responsible of bearing the cost of depollution. We can however consider that the situation is that of a common peril: in this perspective, the effort of one individual to reduce pollution contributes to saving all others’ values. This suggests this effort could be shared between all those who have interest in the saving. Building upon the antique rule of general average, we show that by rediscussing the model of collective action, we can explore new mechanisms to reconcile equity and effectiveness for climate action.