THE AMBIVALENCE OF PRUDENCE IN THE RELATIONS BETWEEN INDUSTRIAL FIRMS AND GOVERNMENT: THE CASE OF SYNTHETIC AMMONIA (1919-1924)

Abstract

During World War I, the question of the supply of nitrogen was a major problem for the French
General staff as it was indispensable to the manufacturing of sufficient powder and explosives.
Given how dangerous the situation had been during the conflict, building a French industry
for synthetic ammonia water appeared necessary after the Armistice in order by the results
which Germany had obtained by the use of the Haber process of ammonia synthesis, the
government used the article 297 of the Treaty of Versailles to liquidate the German chemical
patents and quickly intended to sell their usage to French industrialists. Nevertheless, after
several years of negotiations between the State and the interested companies, the project to
create a national sector failed, because the private firms refused to submit to the constraints
which the political leaders intended to impose them in return for this transfer. The study of
the development of a French sector of synthetic ammonia invites to question the notion of
caution from the perspective of public-private relationships. In particular, how does caution
intervene in firms-state negotiations? The research highlights its ambivalent nature depending
on the actors and the rationalities taken into account.