

ON THE FERTILITY OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY FOR AN UNDERSTANDING OF CERTAIN CURRENT MEDICAL ISSUES RELATED TO MEDICALLY ASSISTED PROCREATION RESPONSIBILITY TOWARDS FUTURE GENERATIONS

*SUR L'UTILITÉ DE LA PHILOSOPHIE POLITIQUE
POUR LA COMPRÉHENSION DE CERTAINS ENJEUX MÉDICAUX
RELATIFS À LA RESPONSABILITÉ IMPLIQUÉE
DE LA PROCRÉATION MÉDICALE ASSISTÉE ENVERS
LES GÉNÉRATIONS CONCERNÉES À VENIR*

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SUMMARY

The modern political science is constructed against the ancient political philosophy on the basis of a negation of nature. The modern humanism is constructed on the basis of controlling nature, as well as the modern political science elaborates the modern anthropology. Humans are from now on considered as rational, free and equal individuals. They are supposed to have got rid of any assumed "natural" feature.

Through medically assisted procreation, the modern medicine makes as well room for an understanding of humans getting rid of "nature". And progress generates as many unexpected difficulties as an impressive amount of solutions to already known problems. Confronting the modern medicine implicit anthropology to the ancient political philosophy one may facilitate the understanding of humans' responsibility towards the future generations who might be concerned by the use of technologies in making them possible. In other words, the efficiency of new technologies makes people accountable for the possibilities they make room to.

KEYWORDS

Artefacts, Assisted medically procreation, Nature, Political philosophy, Responsibility, Sexuality.

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RÉSUMÉ

En même temps qu'à la Renaissance se construit contre la philosophie politique classique la science politique moderne, elle pose les bases de notre anthropologie. Cette anthropologie est celle d'une humanité enfin débarrassée de la nature, et donc constituée d'individus libre, égaux entre eux et rationnels. Au travers de la procréation médicalement assistée, la médecine contribue au même mouvement de dépassement fondamental du donné « naturel ». ce faisant, elle génère autant de nouvelles questions qu'elle résout des problèmes essentiels pour les humains. La mise en perspective de l'anthropologie implicite de la médecine moderne avec l'anthropologie inhérente à la philosophie politique classique permet de dégager quelques aires de responsabilité des sciences médicales contemporaine à l'égard des générations futures qu'elle rend possibles grâce à la PMA. En d'autres termes, c'est son efficace même qui rend la médecine actuelle comptable de ses opérations sur les possibles qu'elle libère, et la pensée classique est utile pour identifier ces formes émergeantes de responsabilité.

MOTS-CLÉS

Artefacts, Nature, Philosophie politique, Procréation médicalement assistée, Responsabilité, Sexualité.

INTRODUCTION

Evaluated in the horizon of modern sciences, philosophy may show the capacity to favour taking distance with short term stakes. This capacity could sound quite interesting. Biotechnologies and genetics offer from now on an increasingly huge amount of unheard possibilities in medicine, concerning particularly medically assisted procreation.

Medically assisted procreation makes room to new possibilities, among which the possibility for people not spontaneously able to reproduce to do so. Doing so, they become able to have children on the dominant basis of their will – duly medically assisted. As an example, among the new possibilities, looms ahead the possibility of “producing” children who's role and destiny might originally be to supply material in case of their brothers and sisters health problems. Being considered as mere biological material, these children would nevertheless not cease to be human – e.g. sooner or later aware of their situation, origin, and destiny. Biotechnologies and genetics cannot not take into account the resulting responsibility of the new possibilities they make room to.

The extreme – but far from impossible – example above makes clear that new sciences make room for unprecedented decisions and deeds resulting from pure human will, and not any more from any supposedly compelling “nature”. On the point of view of philosophy, the issue concerns human will and freedom contrasted to “nature”.

Long time humans assumed they could not overcome nature and its laws. One of the more fundamental illustration of this opinion concerns sexuality. Sexuality and procreation were considered as the most important and enigmatic secret of nature. This is why sexuality has been one of the more if not the most important topic of religions. Nowadays, sexuality and procreation tend to be considered as the result of human will, freedom, and decision-making. To clarify some of the stakes of humans' responsibility towards future generations, who's existence will sooner or later to a certain extent depend on this new state of the art, it may be of some use to clarify the understanding of the out of date situation, when humans used to depend on a compelling nature for procreation. For some reasons which will be presented below, understanding humans as they used to understand themselves previous to the liberation of new modern sciences means understanding ancient politics. Understanding ancient politics may be facilitated by contrasting ancient political philosophy with modern political sciences (I). We deduce an understanding of some stakes of modern sciences responsibility towards future generations resulting from the development of medically assisted procreation (II). We conclude with a tentative ethical appraisal of these stakes and kind of a methodology (III).

TWO POLITICAL MODELS : A COMPARISON

The Basis of the Modern Understanding of Human Will

The modern political science starts with Thomas Hobbes thought. Thomas Hobbes assumes that humans are spontaneously but free, equal, and rational individuals (Hobbes, *Leviathan*, The First Part, ch. XIII). Doing so, Hobbes assumes that humans are spontaneously out of any supposedly compelling “nature”. In our context, “nature” would amount to sexual (e.g. gender), ethnical, and age differences. Hobbes makes the assumption that humans are “naturally” independent of their genders, their ethnical origins, and their ages.

These assumptions are crucial for fostering real equality, freedom, and rationality. It is nevertheless important to make clear the following point.

Thomas Hobbes does not make his assumption for the mere sake of it. To the contrary, when making his assumption about the human “state of nature”, Thomas Hobbes aims at elaborating new bases for politics. Politics which would avoid situations like the English one when he writes, a violent, revolutionary one. Hobbes aims at political peace and stability – to a certain extent, whatever be the price to pay.

Hobbes deduces from his assumption concerning the state of nature that, due to natural scarcity and human vanity, sooner or later humans fight, if only for survival. The “natural state” is a state of war due to being the famous state of “struggle for life” : *homo homini lupus*.

But Hobbes adds that being rational, humans sooner or later as well expect from the possibility of peace and security, through delegating their fundamental right to fight for their lives to a unique authority. The role, duties and right of this unique authority would be the duty and right to use violence when necessary while arbitrating conflicts between people. This would be the key role of the State on Hobbes opinion. The above mentioned delegation consists of the *social contract* itself. Making the first structural convention, humans create the political state of things as such. In other words, one of the key roles of the Hobbes understanding of the State, is that the State or the *Leviathan* plays the role of arbitrator of the citizen conflicts.

The Thomas Hobbes understanding of politics looks quite conservative. Hobbes admits that as soon as people decided to comply with the social contract – which cannot be but general if not universal (1) – they cannot change anything to their submission to the Leviathan. Whereas his great successor John Locke, draws different conclusions from the Hobbes’ ones while grounding his political philosophy on the same notion of “natural state”. On Locke understanding, politics are but individual oriented. John Locke grounds indeed the modern liberalism on the basis of the original Hobbes individualism. The most important illustration of Locke individualistic and liberal opinion is that the main role of the State is understood as protecting and ensuring individuals’ private property (Locke). Understanding so his great predecessor thought, Locke betrays Thomas Hobbes pragmatic intention of political stability. But he actually deepens the understanding of humans as free, equal, and rational individuals. In other words, Lockes makes clear the new anthropology introduced utmost clearly for the first time by Thomas Hobbes. This anthropology is the anthropology of economics.

(1) As far as we know, the evolution of the social contract theories has not yet been systematically examined on the basis of Kojève understanding of the notion of recognition. Yet such an exam would be utmost fruitful for an understanding of the relations between the notion of a “general will” and for instance Kant approach of universality – see Kojève’s *Outline of a Phenomenology of Right* (Kojève, 1981).

Despite his own critics, this anthropology is to a certain extent quite close, if not identical, to the anthropology of will as Nietzsche himself understands it. This is so indeed, due to the concentration of the modern anthropology on freedom – whatever be the understanding of the notion. At the limit, modernity is coeval to individual liberty. Nothing is supposedly be able to prevent such an individual liberty, which is the end – of itself. Defending individualism, liberty, and humans’ dignity sooner or later amounts to defending the sovereignty of will as Immanuel Kant understands it. A will is absolutely good when understanding that its fundamental aim is – but its own possibility as a free will. As the great Franco-German philosopher Eric Weil puts it, the modern self-understanding of humans can be put as an understanding of “the will of and for the will” (our English translation; Weil,).

Here we are with modern political sciences. Despite the very self-understanding of Thomas Hobbes, the modern understanding of politics which is to be traced back to the fundamental Hobbes revolution, is grounded on a decisive priority granted to individuals’ will and freedom, to the potential detriment of collective interest or common good (Bibard, 2012). As said, it is worth comparing the modern political science roots to the ancient political philosophy ones, in order to cope with the problem of modern sciences responsibility in the medicine area.

On the Ancient Political Philosophy of Nature

While implementing the bases for a new understanding of politics, Hobbes is quite aware that he fights against the traditional understanding of politics, which is to be traced back to Aristotle *Politics* (Strauss). Aristotle understanding of political life is radically remote from the Hobbes assumption of a supposedly natural state as he describes it. On Aristotel opinion, the “natural state” of humans is immediately political (Aristotle). And the first illustration of such a political spontaneity is to be found in the spontaneous humans tendency to procreate and reproduce. In other words, heterosexual intercourse is at the basis of political life (Aristotle), which first institutional entity is the heterosexual family (Aristotle).

Such an understanding of political institutional roots may sound quite strange and remote nowadays. It is but unuseful to have in mind that as long as humans did not produce weapons enough, and depended on heterosexual intercourse to ensure the communities sustainability, heterosexuality was crucial to politics. The only way to guarantee the communities strength was to procreate in order to supply citizens and arms. In such a context, homosexuality, celibacy and impotence were punished on the basis of political reasons previous to moral ones. People could for instance

behave as homosexuals as long as they complied with their duty to reproduce.

One of the unpleasant, if not detestable aspects of ancient political philosophy is the implicit assumption of supposedly “natural” hierarchies. And despite Aristotle subtle teaching on male and female relations for instance, it may be taken for granted that ancient political philosophy is but favourable to individualism and liberalism as nowadays understood. Ancient political philosophy admits to a certain extent the legitimacy of hierarchies concerning genders, ethnical origins, and age. All humans are not equal, even more, not equally rational and consequently free. Some humans are to obey others, while some others are to command. It is yet sometimes difficult to identify who's to become a leader and who's to become a follower. The difference is not always clear, particularly in the case of conventional slavery (Aristotle). Conventional slavery is not the only limit to the ancient spontaneous assumption of relevant hierarchies among humans. Sometimes women show more authority or leadership than men (Aristotle). This shows that “nature” is not as clear as people might believe at first.

Yet, despite these nuances, a dominant notion characterizes the ancient understanding of politics, the notion of hierarchy. The most important difference among humans is the difference between leaders and followers. Some people are in certain circumstances to obey, and others to command. And even, due to circumstances or to any other reason, people may change their roles, e.g. followers becoming leaders and leaders, followers, there is an irreducible need for commandment and obedience in human organizational structures. Leadership may be understood on various ways, depending on the degree of control from hierarchy (Weick, ; Bibard). But a minimum of leadership, control and hierarchy is necessary for human organizations to work the right way.

Among these hierarchies, are to be identified as crucial, the hierarchy between parents and children. Some of them are already educated – or are supposedly so –, some others are to be educated. The most important duty of the parents towards their children is to breed and educate them. Grounded on the assumption of an original, e.g. “natural” equality, individuality, freedom and rationality, the modern political science takes for granted that children enjoy to a certain extent immediately the same capacities as grown-ups. Doing so, the modern political science potentially denies the relevance of education (2).

Taking into account the above, we may contrast the ancient political understanding of political life and the modern political sciences one the following way.

(2) This denial becomes visible towards the possibility for children to prosecute their parents.

While ancient political philosophy is grounded on an understanding of “nature” as a compelling and unsurpassable human condition, the modern political science admits the existence of a “natural” state in the rigorous intention to deny its relevance. But doing so, the modern political sciences make room for the action of a self-prophecy process: the modern political sciences assumption of a supposedly “natural” anthropology becomes a norm for the future. People should reach a level of a universal recognition of their indomitable free, equal, and rational individuality. The modern political sciences assume and shape at once a world where everyone would enjoy the freedom to will the way he/she wants, to the limit independently of any collective constraint. To the contrary, the ancient political philosophy understanding of politics is grounded on a fundamental priority granted to a notion of the common good. In this horizon, one of the aspects of the human life which needs a radical privacy – e.g. sexuality and love – is supposed to be under the community control. Plato is the one who pushes the understanding of this difficulty the furthest. On his opinion, or on his characters’ opinions, the common good is guaranteed but by eliminating the very root of the possibility of aiming at private goods – e.g. at the very level of erotic desire (Platon). Sexuality and love are but considered as public issues in the Plato's *Republic*.

It is time to consider our current situation on the basis of the above.

To a certain extent, we are in a context close to Plato's *Republic*. Sexuality and love are considered as public issues. Everybody talks of sexuality on a definitely transparent way, which makes love and sexuality paradoxically excluded from privacy (3). Yet on the other hand, what is publicly claimed, is the right to enjoy life the way everyone likes it, on the strict basis of private choices, and par excellence, sexuality orientation. Privacy is at the root of any tentative understanding of public life.

The nowadays indomitable mix between private and public goods, through the understanding of human will and the radical wish for transparency must be understood on the basis of the modern notion of “control” over “nature”. Modernity means no more than the dream that humans take control over nature, to the point that the very understanding of any “nature” does not any more mean anything (4). The

(3) The current development of pornography to the point pornography becomes an aspect of “normal” human life illustrates this tendency to make everything transparent – particularly what was so far considered as “private”. By the way, the development of some social networks shows the same.

(4) The modern political science replaces the ancient political philosophy, because philosophy indeed grounds its development on the basis of a recognition of a root of everything which is to the limit called “nature”, whereas modern sciences – which are created by people like Descartes and Hobbes – admit an original notion of “nature” in order to definitely encompass, overcome and eliminate it. This is the radical intention of the so-called “humanists”.

notion of “nature” progressively disappears from the vocabulary of philosophy and from our lives. This happens particularly when people feel legitimate in aiming at procreating the way they want – which ways are made available by modern sciences and technologies. Politically speaking, this means that politics are not any more to be understood as “natural”. Everything which is political is supposed to depend on artificial – e.g. specifically human or unnatural – conventions. This is the nowadays implicit ideal state of the art : everyone would totally get rid of nature, and procreate as she/he wishes, independently of any taken for granted body condition.

ON MEDICALLY ASSISTED PROCREATION TOWARDS FUTURE GENERATIONS RESPONSIBILITY

The Plato's *Republic* dream of eugenics, resulting in biological selections of the best breeds to the aim of ensuring best procreation and strongest citizens has now become possible – or is about to become possible. The difference with Plato's *Republic* best (and supposedly only *in speech* (5)) regime is that the dream is now a private one : each individual may aim at having children the way she/he imagines, concerning the *way* to procreate and the *result* of procreation. The responsibility of medically assisted procreation towards the future generations who might be concerned by its deeds concerns the *result* of procreation – e.g. the children resulting from MAP technologies. In order to go to the point, it is useful to remind the given example when introducing this paper. Let us imagine children who are created (the right word is “created” indeed) for the exclusive sake of some of their – nevertheless – brothers and sisters' health. These children would result from the will to safeguard other humans than themselves, and would to the limit be considered as mere biological material. More generally, whatever be the degree of given “education” to such breeds, the stake is the following : what will be in the future some of the resulting sentiments of those who will exist on the very basis of strict, rational, supposedly legitimately free, on-purpose decisions from their “parents” – be them “biological” or not ? One might at first glance say that the alluded “sentiments” will be quite close to any “naturally” conceived human being. Independently of any artificial operation, every human results from her/his parents more or less clear and aware decision to reproduce. Every human sooner or later tries to appropriate her/his own life, on the basis of her/his conception, which may be very positive, spontaneous, harmonious – as

well as negative, resulting from procreation technologies or violent. In other words, to a certain extent, the degree of autonomy of a decision to procreate has *a priori* no specific consequence on the existential understanding of her/his life by the breed. Yet an existence exclusively based on the desire from parents to protect the health of their “real” children may represent a huge problem for the life of a breed specifically dedicated to supply potential biological material to her/his sisters and brothers. This might actually look a slavery situation, if not worse. Slaves used to be considered as material for their masters, but on the very basis of their deeds, or their capacity to do something – to work, etc. Sometimes slaves were as well considered as sexual material for their masters' sake. Isn't there a potential increasing gravity when people might die from the biological use of their bodies – consequently considered as pure material, or pure means for the sake of other people – supposedly the “real” one ?

Here we are to the point. On Kant moral perspective, no human should ever be considered as mere means for the sake of heterogeneous ends – for independent, foreign or external ends to the individual. Kant famous categorical imperative states this way : Humans “should never act in such a way that they treat Humanity, whether in themselves or in others, as a means only but always as an end in itself” Which is previously formulated the following ways : « Act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law »

In other words, autonomy is at the root of Kant understanding of a really “free” will. Freedom or liberty results from autonomy, which is the main expression of morality. Morality concerns the good for the sake of the good (Kant.). Nothing which depends on external conditions to the will considered for the sake of the will may be considered as contributing to a moral – e.g. a good – action (Kant.). This means that each human should be conceived on the basis of being conceived for the sake of herself or himself. No human being may be conceived on the exclusive basis of being a means for her/his parents' pleasure – whatever might they be, her/his “biological” parents or not.

Consequently, a human being who would be created for the exclusive sake of her/his sisters and brother, in order to supply biological material; a human being who would be created for the exclusive sake of her/his parents; a human being who would be created for servicing other human beings would not be conceived on the basis of morality. Even less a human who's role would be to replace another (in the possible case of clones), etc etc.

Let us come back to the concerned breeds sentiments about their potential so-called “parents, who decided to conceive them for external reasons than themselves.

(5) Strauss, *The City and Man*, II; cf Plato, *Republic*, end of Book IX.

Their sentiment could be sentiments of angriness and desire for revenge, to be considered and treated as mere material – not as an end, or as a human, rational if not reasonable being.

But as soon as the kantian argument has been invoked, it deletes the specificity of the nowadays as well as the future scientific and technological situation. First, because if a kantian argument still seems relevant, it may be anticipated that nothing changed radically enough compared to Kant epoch, to invalidate his moral argument. Second, every human being has ever been the result of an aware and a spontaneous, not really deliberate, desire for reproduction. If something changes, it is not as to people aim when procreating. It is as to the very possibility to make their will real – independently of its content. The problem is that from now on, children may think adequately “I am the result of an intentional, deliberate, clear decision, rooted on the very possibility to make a will or a wish real.” Nevertheless consequently my question may become : “What about *my* will and *my* wishes ?” “ I am the breed of these people, in certain circumstances and to that purpose, *but I do not want to be so*. I may even want to deny my own existence, if this existence is supposed to be dedicated to other people use.” In other words for the first time in human history, suicide becomes ontologically legitimate.

Such sentiments are of course ancestral. But the legitimacy of negation is here much more if not qualitatively different and legitimate than the same sentiments in a context where people existence did not depend exclusively on other humans' will. Here, we are confronted to a situation where will confronts will, not only on the same time, but through time, generation after generation. Conforming to the modern political sciences basis, wills confront each other, independently of people ages. Struggle for life is indeed the real humans' situation in a context where sciences and technologies at a first glance make room for an infinity of technological possibilities concerning the very conception of human beings. The “natural state of war” identified by Hobbes as the pre-historical beginning of humanity might become a *future* state of war, resulting from the “nature” domination by human will, and producing a struggle for will power and triumph – sometimes against life itself.

The way Kant solved the problem of what he called the human “unsociable sociability” was to observe, on the very basis of human fights and injustice, the operation of an “invisible hand”, making people progress from brutality towards humanity despite if not through their selfish personal interests themselves. In other words, the spontaneous human struggles would foster the emergence of the notion of Right, and its noblest rules (Kant, 1963).

It is from now on impossible to anticipate the future as Hans Jonas would have wished to a certain extent.

Too many uncertainties prevail in the current context to make credible any forecast about the future. But taking into account what we just mentioned concerning new biotechnologies on one hand, and the contrasting of the two above mentioned political models on the other hand, we may state our perspective on Medically Assisted Procreation technologies towards the future generations the following way.

ABOUT THE FUTURE : ON ETHICS, RULES, INNOVATIONS AND VIGILANCE

Considered empirically, the fight of will against will has no end. And as well there is no reason why the will of a human artificially procreated should be better than a spontaneously created will, there is of course no reason why it should be worse and not taken into consideration. In any case nevertheless, the Kant categorical imperative does not *specially* help in solving the *existential* problem of people resulting from Medically Assisted Procreation. But as modernity results from a release of human will beyond any “natural” frontier; as modernity means for humanity becoming unnatural, without any significant criteria as to how to implement some guidelines for human intervention on life through biotechnologies and genetics, one might wonder what about an “ancient” ethical approach of biotechnologies and genetics ?

The ancient – here, the Greeks –, of course knew about the possibility of a universal struggle for life, grounded on the law of the strongest rather than on the respect of a supposedly “natural law” which would orient and frame human behaviour (cf the stake of Plato's *Republic* as sketched Book I, in the discussion between Socrates and Thrasymacus). In other words, the Ancient knew about the spontaneous – e.g. natural – tendency to try to overcome natural laws (Aristotle, *Ethics*). Not only did they know about this spontaneous tendency, but they would have put it the following way.

The human tendency to try to overcome natural laws is spontaneous – e.g. natural. This tendency is inherent to human nature. Nature conceals the essential human tendency to try to overcome natural laws, and to aim at replacing gods. Humans are but by nature potentially unnatural (Aristotle). But nature prevents anything to overcome itself; nature is the context and the indomitable place of humans' deeds, speeches and thoughts. Sooner or later, nature makes things come back as they are – e.g. as they should be in the horizon of the “natural right” (Strauss). Put in the horizon of ethics, such statement becomes that the right research for humans' moral concerns moderation. Aiming at moderate behaviour means humanizing oneself for humans. Moderation is the central criteria of morality or ethics on Aristotle perspective.

The problem is that the understanding of moderation depends on the concerned deeds, speeches, and thoughts : there is not any possible *a priori* anticipation of the understanding of the *content* of moderation *per se*. As well as the relevance of any human law, moderation fundamentally depends on the evaluated situation which; on Aristotle opinion, characterizes the so-called "natural right" (Aristotle, *Ethics*, Book V). The content of moderation depends of what moderation is about. Moderation about drinking wine has as an example to be understood in the horizon of the body health, whereas moderation about the will of power is to be in the possible horizon of politics, etc etc. In other words, *people need to have clearly in mind what they aim at and the context of their wishes to try to evaluate the relevance of their wishes and their projects*.

Nobody can unquestionably tell any "objective", transcendental if not transcendent limit to the modern sciences and technologies progress concerning human life and medicine. But a few elements among which some of them particularly taken into account by a taosit approach of medicine may help in shaping the right frame for an "ethical" attitude towards it.

Undoubtedly, humans have long been the indomitable result of heterosexual intercourses. Pregnancy being exclusively feminine, humans were so far all born of women. But the women were always previously fecundated by men. In other words, the origin of humans' existence has initially been heterosexual – each human concealing both sexualities.

This "natural" state of the art – which by the way is the state of the art at the origin of the Aristotelian ancient political philosophy –, might represent one of the roots of the basis for thinking the specific needed moderation about sciences and technologies progress in medicine nowadays.

It is worth reminding here the Taoist understanding of the human body, as memory, presence and desire altogether. The human body is but pure mechanism. It embodies the individual origins as well as prepares its impulses, the vital ones included. In this perspective, any creation of human breed involves the responsibility of being able to help herself/himself carrying out to language and to an adequate related awareness each concerned people. This means developing the relevant disciplines able to supply the right dedicated tools.

The second root of the basis for thinking the specific needed moderation about sciences and technologies progress in medicine is the consideration of the limits of the will of power, or the will as exclusively free, self-grounded and autonomous. In other words, the consideration of the will empirically speaking may radically contradict the Kantian understanding of morals as Kant puts it in his *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Moral*. We are from now on able to decide rationally, on the basis of a deliberate decision,

to create new humans. It is in other words impossible to make room to alive and desiring to procreate people without balancing their desire and intention with the possible sentiments of their potential breeds – e.g. with their potential breeds' will. In this horizon, the central question is : "Am I willing to procreate for the exclusive sake of my own personal pleasure ?" As I can benefit from new scientific and technical possibilities, I cannot hide from now on. My responsibility is engaged when deciding rationally and deliberately to procreate despite some original "natural" conditions, or on the basis of unnatural means.

This is all the more true, that it is indomitable that, manipulating biology and genetics as we nowadays do, we humans are transforming in a flash million years of life evolution. It is impossible to faint ignoring such a discrepancy between human sudden power over nature and the nature pace.

At least two principles should be checked before making a decision concerning Medically Assisted Procreation :

- 1) Are the two sexualities duly represented in the future human "material" ?
- 2) How can the will of the future human be anticipated when taking into account her/his artificial origin ?

The answers to these two sets of questions should make a bit less difficult the elaboration of specific ethical rules concerning the immense new possibilities released by the new biotechnologies and genetics. Language, moderate but indomitable will, and heterosexuated ultimate origin are the three roots of humans any place, any time. ■

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